✎✎✎ Yamashita Case Summary

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Yamashita Case Summary



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Gen. Yamashita Sentenced to Death by Hanging and other Japanese criminals too

They were then placed aboard a US government-leased plane and flown to Egypt. Several days later, Egypt made a formal request that Indonesia extradite Madni for unspecified, terrorism-related crimes. Abusive interrogations by the military appear to have begun in Afghanistan as early as December and continued despite high-profile media accounts, and perhaps encouraged by the sidelining and disparaging of the Geneva Conventions by US officials. Reports by civilian Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI agents who witnessed detainee abuse by military personnel at Guantanamo—including forcing chained detainees to sit in their own excrement—reinforced accounts by former detainees describing the use of painful stress positions, extended solitary confinement, military dogs to threaten them, threats of torture and death, and prolonged exposure to extremes of heat, cold, and noise.

Many techniques used on detainees by military personnel at Abu Ghraib prison and other Iraqi locations resembled abuse seen earlier in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, including forced standing and exercise, shackling detainees in painful positions or close confinement, extensive long-term sleep deprivation, and exposure to cold. Abuse spread throughout Iraq from late and into Documented cases included beatings and suffocation, [] sexual abuse, [] mock executions, [] and electro-shock torture. The tactics used in mock SERE interrogations resembled many of the practices used immediately afterwards in Afghanistan and Guantanamo.

These included stripping detainees naked for degradation purposes, exploiting cultural or religious taboos, and use of forced standing, exposure to cold, and prolonged sleep deprivation. A week later, on September 25, , a delegation of senior officials visited Guantanamo to discuss interrogations there. Dunlavey told Philippe Sands that the group discussed the interrogation of Mohamed al-Qahtani, a detainee suspected of direct involvement in the September 11 attacks. Diane Beaver, Gen. By October 11, , Dunlavey sent a memo and an attached legal opinion by Lt. Beaver to Gen. James Hill of Southern Command requesting authority to use aggressive interrogation techniques.

In late October , the documents were sent from Gen. Hill to Gen. Richard Meyers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with recommendations that the secretary of defense authorize the techniques listed. On November 14, , Col. Britt Mallow, a senior commander at the Criminal Investigation Task Force CITF at Guantanamo who had already raised concerns about abusive interrogations with senior Pentagon officials, together with others expressed his legal concerns to Guantanamo commander Gen. Nevertheless, General Counsel Haynes submitted the techniques to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld for approval in late November , with a one-page cover letter recommending he approve most of the methods—but not waterboarding.

Why is standing limited to 4 hours? Those captured or otherwise taken into custody during the international armed conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan should have been presumptively classified as POWs, and afforded the protections due to POWs under the Third Geneva Convention. The Defense Department investigation chaired by James R. Contrary to the attention given interrogation techniques at Guantanamo, there was no prescribed interrogation regime for prisoners in Afghanistan.

According to the review of Defense Department interrogation operations conducted by Vice Adm. Albert T. Officials in Afghanistan appear to have begun drawing up a set of policies based both on the techniques they were already utilizing and others they had learned from their trip to Guantanamo. Carolyn Wood, who had helped develop interrogation policies for non-special forces in Afghanistan in late —and who was implicated in the beating deaths of two detainees there in December —was stationed in Iraq and put in command of Abu Ghraib interrogation operations in mid, under the new Combined Joint Task Force 7 CJTF In July , Capt.

The overall military commander for Iraq, Gen. The abusive techniques approved, along with the techniques used by SMU TF units, were among those being used at Abu Ghraib through the beginning of The War Crimes Act of provides criminal punishment for whomever, inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime, if either the perpetrator or the victim is a member of the US Armed Forces or a national of the United States. The Military Commissions Act revised the War Crimes Act and limited the definition of war crimes, with retroactive effect.

As a result, humiliating and degrading treatment of detainees in US counterterrorism operations following the September 11 attacks can no longer be charged as war crimes under the statute. However, this does not change liability for murder and torture. The Anti-Torture Act 18 U. Some of the crimes listed above are subject to a statute of limitations. Under federal law, charges for the crimes of assault, kidnapping, and acts against rights must ordinarily be brought within five years of the date of the commission of the offense. For the crime of torture, the statute of limitations is at least eight years, [] and arguably does not exist at all. Homicide, sexual abuse, and war crimes resulting in death are not subject to a limitation period.

Conspiracy : In addition to the substantive offenses listed above, there is sufficient evidence to open a criminal investigation into whether senior Bush administration officials engaged in a criminal conspiracy to commit offenses such as torture and war crimes. This conspiracy would include, at a minimum, the top officials listed in this report as well as the lawyers who drafted legal memoranda seeking to justify torture. A conspiracy to commit a federal crime may fall under the general federal conspiracy statute 18 U. The essential elements required to bring a charge of conspiracy under 18 U. Specific intent is an essential element of criminal conspiracy. In addition, it is not necessary for conspirators to have known or intended for the conspiracy to violate federal law per se.

As the Supreme Court has said:. While conspiracy is subject to a five-year statute of limitations, it is a continuing crime that does not end until the last co-conspirator commits the last overt act of the conspiracy. There is no immunity from prosecution in US courts for the acts described in this report. Senior US officials did not physically commit acts of abuse. However, civilian superiors and military commanders can be held criminally liable as principals if they order, induce, instigate, aid, or abet in the commission of a crime. This is a principle recognized both in US [] and international law. Three elements are needed to establish such liability:. The US armed forces have long recognized the principle of command responsibility.

Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of the Japanese forces in the Philippines in World War II, whose troops committed brutal atrocities against the civilian population and prisoners of war. General Yamashita, who had lost almost all command, control, and communications over his troops, was nevertheless convicted by the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo based on the doctrine of command responsibility. Michael D. Maples in gave testimony that, in his view, waterboarding violated the laws of war. Courts in the US and other tribunals have repeatedly found that waterboarding, or variations of it, constitute torture and is a war crime : []. These methods violate the protections afforded to all persons in custody—whether combatants or civilians—under the laws of armed conflict and can amount to torture or inhuman treatment.

For detainees who should be considered POWs or were entitled to a presumption of POW status, mistreatment by these methods would be a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Serious violations of the laws of war committed with criminal intent, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, are war crimes. The field manual also prohibits forms of coercion including threats. The US government has itself denounced as torture these same methods when practiced by other countries, including Burma being forced to squat or remain in uncomfortable periods for long periods of time , Egypt stripping and blindfolding of prisoners , Eritrea tying of hands and feet for extended periods of time , Iran sleep deprivation and suspension for long periods in contorted positions , Iraq food and water deprivation , Jordan sleep deprivation and solitary confinement , Pakistan prolonged isolation and denial of food or sleep , Saudi Arabia sleep deprivation , Tunisia food and sleep deprivation , and Turkey prolonged standing, isolation.

Threatening a prisoner with torture to make him talk is considered to be a form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. And, of course, many of the pictures from Abu Ghraib show unmuzzled dogs being used to intimidate detainees, sometimes while they are cowering, naked. Disappearances violate or threaten to violate a range of rules of international human rights and humanitarian law, including arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture, and the right to life. US law places limits on the treatment of detained terrorist suspects. The US Supreme Court ruled in that the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which Congress passed after the September 11, attacks and authorizes presidential action against al Qaeda and allied forces, gave the president power to detain enemy belligerents.

The prolonged, unacknowledged, incommunicado detention of persons in secret CIA facilities constitutes enforced disappearances under international law. Information continues to reach the Working Group on the existence of secret detention centres where terrorist suspects are held in complete isolation from the outside world. In [this situation], people disappear. As is well documented, disappearance is often a precursor to torture and even to extrajudicial execution. The string of legal opinions and memoranda by Bush administration lawyers on detainee issues since September 11, , appear to have been intended to shield US officials from potential liability. Gonzales then explained to the president that "it is difficult to predict the motives of prosecutors and independent counsels who may in future decide to pursue unwarranted charges based on Section [the War Crimes Act].

Your determination [that the Geneva Conventions do not apply] would create a reasonable basis in law that Section does not apply, which would provide a solid defense to any future prosecution. Bush and others have asserted that they approved the detention and interrogation techniques described above only after legal review by Department of Justice attorneys.

At the same time, due process concerns would seem to bar conviction when a defendant engages in conduct in reasonable reliance on an official interpretation of the law. Good faith reliance on advice of counsel should be an important factor, among others, to consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the practices to be unlawful. In the context of practices such as waterboarding, prolonged stress positions and long-term incommunicado detention, it stretches credulity to argue that a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were illegal.

In addition, there is now substantial evidence that the initiative for abusive interrogation techniques came largely from civilian leaders, and that politically appointed administration lawyers created legal justifications in the face of opposition from career government legal officers. Avoiding prosecution is literally a theme of the memoranda. Reportedly, the following day, Bush sent his name forward for formal nomination. Chertoff refused to provide such a declination. Under international law, states are obligated to investigate credible allegations of war crimes and serious violations of human rights committed by their nationals and members of their armed forces, or over which they have jurisdiction, and appropriately prosecute those responsible.

War crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law committed willfully—that is, deliberately or recklessly—and give rise to individual criminal responsibility. The US also has a duty to investigate serious violations of international human rights law and punish the perpetrators. Those seeking a remedy shall have this right determined by competent judicial, administrative, or legislative authorities. And when granted, these remedies shall be enforced by competent authorities. Civilian leaders and commanders may also be prosecuted for war crimes and violations of international human rights law as a matter of command responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission of war crimes and took insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those responsible.

However, no US federal court, including the Supreme Court, has granted judicial remedy to persons alleging torture or other ill-treatment, including rendition to torture, in post-September 11 cases. Both the Bush and the Obama administrations have argued successfully that such cases should be dismissed under the state secrets privilege in US law. The state secrets privilege allows the head of an executive department to refuse to produce evidence in a court case on the grounds that the evidence is secret information that would harm national security or foreign relations interests if disclosed.

Investigation and referral to prosecution are required for all serious violations of human rights law, but monetary and other forms of compensation can also be provided. One US court has suggested compensation as a way to partially mitigate some of the abuse alleged in this report. Based on the information presented above, Human Rights Watch believes that there is sufficient basis for the US government to order a broad criminal investigation into alleged war crimes and human rights violations committed in connection with the torture and ill-treatment of detainees, the CIA secret detention program, and the rendition of detainees to torture.

Such an investigation would necessarily focus on alleged criminal conduct by the following four senior officials—George W. Human Rights Watch presents evidence now publicly available, but expresses no opinion about the ultimate guilt or innocence of these or other officials. President Bush was commander-in-chief of the US armed forces, and the senior executive officer of the US government, exercising full control over all of its executive agencies, including the CIA. Bush often chaired NSC meetings and was briefed extensively and routinely on all national security matters.

Bush approved coercive interrogation methods, including waterboarding, ordered the CIA secret detention program, and approved the program of unlawful renditions. In addition, even after learning that serious abuses were taking place, Bush never intervened to stop them or seek to prosecute those responsible. Bush acknowledged on several occasions that he approved waterboarding of detainees, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah. He also acknowledged in his memoirs that he approved the waterboarding of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed:. In March , Bush vetoed legislation containing a provision requiring that CIA interrogations comply with the US Army field manual on interrogations, which barred certain interrogation techniques, including waterboarding.

On September 17, , President Bush reportedly signed a memorandum, apparently still classified, authorizing the CIA to kill, capture, detain, and interrogate al Qaeda members and others thought to be involved in the September 11 attacks. It is not known whether Bush approved a separate finding for secret detentions or whether this was covered in the September 17 memo. Bush knew or should have known that many rendered detainees would likely face torture and other ill-treatment, and took no steps to stop the program or punish those responsible. Vice President Cheney played a key role in the formulation of detainee policy.

Together with his chief counsel, David Addington, he was the principal political force pressing OLC lawyers to justify the use of coerced interrogation methods. Cheney has spoken publicly about the entire approval process for CIA interrogation, including his own role, for instance telling the Washington Times :. As described above, Cheney was among the main White House officials briefed on CIA abduction and rendition operations, and he discussed these operations with the president. He advised the president to generally authorize CIA renditions operations and he sought formal authorization from the president, approving particular operations. Vice President Cheney knew or should have known that renditions would lead to torture. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld created the conditions for members of the US armed forces to commit torture and other war crimes by approving interrogation techniques that violated the Geneva Conventions and the Convention against Torture.

Rumsfeld made numerous statements indicating that the US was not bound to treat detainees in accordance with international law. While not in itself a criminal offense, it helped create the conditions in the armed forces that facilitated such abuses. It also made clear that he was unlikely to take action against military personnel that did not conform to international legal requirements. Taft, IV, said this. Rumsfeld approved coercive interrogation methods, including those that amounted to torture.

From the earliest days of the war in Afghanistan, Rumsfeld was on notice through briefings, ICRC reports, reports by human rights organizations, and media accounts that members of the US armed forces were conducting coercive interrogations, including torture. However, there is no evidence that he ever exerted his authority to stop the torture and ill-treatment of detainees or take action against those responsible.

Rumsfeld was intimately involved in the minutiae of interrogation techniques for detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As described above, on December 2, , he authorized a list of techniques for interrogation of prisoners in Guantanamo that was an unprecedented expansion of US military doctrine. As described above, depending on how they are used, these methods likely violate the prohibition on torture or inhuman treatment of prisoners under the laws of armed conflict, regardless of whether the prisoners are entitled to POW status, and those responsible for their use could be liable for war crimes.

Rather than discard the techniques entirely, however, he ordered that he personally approve any use of the harsher categories of techniques, thus suggesting that he continued to view them as legitimate. Such a request should include a thorough justification for the use of such techniques. Rumsfeld issued a final interrogation policy for Guantanamo on April 16, These guidelines, while more restrictive than the December rules, still allowed techniques that go beyond what the Geneva Conventions permit for POWs.

As described above, coercive interrogation methods first approved by Rumsfeld were used in Guantanamo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Interrogators in Iraq, already familiar with some of these ideas, implemented them even prior to any policy guidance from CJTF-7 [the command in Iraq]. Even before the December 2, memo, Guantanamo commander, Maj. While no one in the chain of command can now seem to remember who issued the VOCO, it was apparently assumed by officers in the chain of command that Rumsfeld issued it. Randall M. Schmidt, Rumsfeld spoke weekly with General Miller about the progress of the interrogation, which employed weeks of sleep deprivation, stress positions, and sexual humiliation.

Interrogators made him stand nude, told him to bark like a dog and growl, and hung pictures of scantily clad women around his neck. After refusing water, al-Qahtani was forced to accept an intravenous drip for hydration and, on several occasions, was denied trips to a latrine causing him to urinate on himself at least twice. On one occasion was forced to undergo an enema.

At one point in the interrogation, being subjected to extended sleep deprivation, his heart rate dropped to a dangerously low level of 35 beats per minute. According to Gitanjali Gutierrez, an attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights who represented al-Qahtani after his torture, his weight dropped from approximately to just over pounds in about four months. David Becker, a senior intelligence officer at Guantanamo involved in crafting the interrogation plan for al-Qahtani, said that Guantanamo commander Gen. General Schmidt, who along with Brig.

John Furlow investigated detainee abuse at Guantanamo, [] told the army inspector general in that it was clear to him that there was a direct communication link between Rumsfeld and his office in Washington to General Dunlavey and later General Miller, and from there directly to interrogators. James T. Hill also confirmed that Rumsfeld and his office regularly spoke with, and were being directly briefed by, General Miller on the al-Qahtani interrogation.

He also stated that Rumsfeld himself called him in at some point in mid-January about the al-Qahtani interrogation. According to Hill, Rumsfeld asked about the status of the interrogation, concerned because of the impending actions of Adm. Alberto Mora, described above. This was a few days before the interrogation was stopped because of ongoing controversy. Hill said that he would call Miller, and then call Rumsfeld back:. In fact, the techniques being used on al-Qahtani were illegal, and Rumsfeld had been warned that they were illegal. By this point in January , Admiral Mora and other military lawyers had alerted Rumsfeld that the techniques he had authorized in his December 2, order, which were at that time being used on al-Qahtani, could trigger criminal liability.

Ultimately, the convening authority for the Guantanamo military commissions, the top Defense Department official overseeing prosecutions at Guantanamo, military judge Susan J. Crawford, who had served as an Army general counsel and inspector general of the Department of Defense, reached the conclusion that al-Qahtani had been tortured, and could not be prosecuted because of the mistreatment he suffered. Rumsfeld appears to be responsible as a matter of command responsibility for the widespread use of torture and ill-treatment by US military personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. Paul Bremer, [] Afghan government officials, [] and journalists. Donald Ryder, [] and retired Col. Stuart A. Herrington in internal reports.

The sheer number and widespread nature of abuses against detainees across three countries should have in any event put Rumsfeld on notice through internal channels. Yet Rumsfeld failed to intervene to prevent further commission of crimes. Even as he was being publicly and personally warned about abuses, he apparently never issued specific orders or guidelines to forbid coercive methods of interrogation, other than withdrawing his blanket approval for certain methods at Guantanamo in January Indeed, as described above, in mid pressure on interrogators in Iraq to use more aggressive methods of questioning detainees was actually increased. Had Rumsfeld exerted his authority as the civilian official in charge of the armed forces and used his position and authority to bring the mistreatment of prisoners to a stop, many violations of international law that US forces committed could have been avoided.

Under his direction, the CIA abducted and rendered persons to countries known to torture detainees; tortured and ill-treated detainees; and forcibly disappeared detainees in secret locations, often with no acknowledgement of their detention and with no oversight of their treatment. As Tenet reportedly told a closed-door international meeting of top intelligence officials on March 10, , in New Zealand:. Tenet directly oversaw the CIA rendition program, which led to the torture and ill-treatment of detainees abroad. During NSC meetings in , Tenet presented options for covert CIA rendition operations, implemented orders to use renditions, and briefed the president and NSC on renditions operations.

Tenet knew or should have known that detainees transferred to foreign countries faced a high risk of torture. Tenet designed and oversaw the CIA renditions program. So basically the number one and two men in the intelligence community are the ones who signed off. Citing congressional sources , Newsweek reported that at a classified briefing for senators not long after the September 11 attacks, Tenet was asked whether the US was planning to seek the transfer of suspected al Qaeda detainees from governments known for their brutality.

The rendition of terror suspects following the September 11 attacks was first reported in The Washington Post in December , which described transfers to countries including Syria, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, where they are believed to have been tortured or otherwise ill-treated. We send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them. Tenet was undoubtedly aware of the torture involved in these renditions even before the early media reports. In Egypt:. Under Tenet, the CIA organized a program in which terrorism suspects were detained in undisclosed locations, with no access to the ICRC, no oversight of their treatment, no notification to their families, and in many cases, no acknowledgement that they were even being held.

As described above, prolonged incommunicado detention in an unreported location constitutes an enforced disappearance and may violate many basic human rights, including the right to be free from torture and other ill-treatment. The CIA interrogation program included acts that amounted to torture, ill-treatment, sexual abuse, among other offenses. Any change in the plan—even if an extra day of a certain treatment was added—was signed off on by the Director.

Their roles should therefore also be investigated. Normally, jurisdiction over a crime depends on a link between the prosecuting state and the crime itself. This link is most often territorial but is sometimes based on the nationality of the victim or perpetrator or on harm to a state interest. Universal jurisdiction reflects the principle of international law that every state has an interest in bringing to justice the perpetrators of particular crimes of international concern, no matter where the crime was committed, and regardless of nationalities.

Universal jurisdiction is a crucial tool by which victims of grave international crimes can obtain redress. The most well-known case of universal jurisdiction was perhaps that of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet who was arrested in London in October on a warrant from a Spanish judge charging him with torture and other human rights crimes committed in Chile during his seventeen-year rule. In the past two decades, more and more states, especially in Western Europe, [] have been willing to use their universal jurisdiction laws in practice.

Cases successfully brought to trial have principally involved low and mid-level perpetrators with regards to crimes committed during the genocide in Rwanda, the wars in the Balkans, crimes committed during the dictatorships in Argentina and Chile, wars in Afghanistan and West Africa, and systematic torture in Mauritania, DR Congo, and Tunisia, among others. Individuals of dozens of nationalities have been detained by the United States since September 11, , thus possibly investing the national courts of these individuals with passive personality jurisdiction over torture and war crimes committed by US nationals.

Most countries, though not all, condition the opening of an investigation for crimes committed abroad, when there is no other link to the forum, on the presence of the accused in their territory. As it became clear that the US was not pursuing investigations into the role and responsibility of senior government officials linked to torture and the secret detention and rendition programs, several cases were filed abroad, one of which is ongoing. Germany is one of the few states which do not require the presence of the accused on its territory to begin an investigation for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide under the universal jurisdiction principle i.

In the absence of the alleged perpetrator, however, article of the German criminal procedure code gives broad discretion to the federal prosecutor as to whether to open an investigation. Following the complaint, it was reported that Rumsfeld would skip the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy, at which he was traditionally a key speaker. On February 10, a few days before the Munich conference, German Prosecutor General Kay Nehm dismissed the complaint on the ground the US would investigate the matter in its own country. Nehm stated:. The decision did not discuss whether Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense, enjoyed immunity.

The next day, Rumsfeld announced that he would attend the Munich conference. The plaintiffs filed a request to review the decision with the prosecutor as well as with the court. The Higher Regional Court Oberlandesgericht in Stuttgart declared the application for review inadmissible on September 13, In November , several days after Rumsfeld resigned as defense secretary, CCR and ECCHR filed another criminal complaint with the German federal prosecutor on behalf of Guantanamo detainee Mohammed al-Qahtani, whose treatment is described in this report, and11 Iraqis who alleged they had been tortured.

On April 5, , the prosecutor general at the Federal Court of Justice announced she would not proceed with an investigation. The complaint alleged that Rumsfeld had direct and command responsibility for torture in US-run detention facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo. The Paris district prosecutor, Jean-Claude Marin, dismissed the complaint on November 16, , without addressing the torture allegations. The Paris prosecutor dismissed a subsequent request for consideration. Two complaints implicating US officials have been filed in Spain. One has been temporarily suspended while the other remains in progress. Miller be subpoenaed to explain his role in the alleged torture of four of these detainees.

In , Spain weakened its universal jurisdiction laws after several countries whose leaders were subject to complaints, including the US, expressed diplomatic concerns. This pressure continues under the Obama administration. He confirmed that Spain would suspend its proceedings if the US investigated the matters. It's a matter in the Spanish courts, as I'm given to understand. I don't have a comment for you on it at this time. The Obama administration's position on the matters that are under discussion, I think are quite clear. The cables also reveal US concern in relation to a separate investigation by Spanish judges into the use of a Spanish airport for secret CIA flights reportedly carrying detainees.

This report was written by Reed Brody, counsel and spokesperson for Human Rights Watch, based on archival and legal research. Sections of the report were researched and drafted by John Sifton, consultant. The report was edited by Andrea Prasow, senior counterterrorism counsel; James Ross, legal and policy director; and Danielle Haas, senior editor. Joanne Mariner, formerly terrorism and counterterrorism director, reviewed earlier versions of the report.

Senior Associate Kate Wies contributed to production of the report. In June , Time magazine reported that Durham was looking into the death in Abu Ghraib of Manadel al-Jamadi, an Iraqi prisoner known as "the Iceman" because his body was cooled in ice. Vice Adm. Antonio M. Paul T. George R. James R. Richard P. Army Brig. John Furlow and Air Force Lt. Sanchez and Maj. Taft, IV, legal advisor, to John C. The memorandum can be found in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel, eds. Taliban soldiers should have been accorded POW status because they openly fought for the armed forces of a state party to the Convention. Al Qaeda detainees would likely not be accorded POW status but the Conventions and customary law still provide explicit protections to all persons held in an armed conflict.

This view is shared by the ICRC and other international observers. There are divergent views between the United States and the ICRC on the procedures which apply on how to determine that the persons detained are not entitled to prisoner of war status. Press, , rule 90, citing, for example, US Lieber Code, art. Information about these cases is also based on extensive conversations with journalists who have researched the cases and requested information from US military spokespeople in Kabul during The minutes reveal that several abusive interrogation methods under discussion at the meeting and later approved for Guantanamo were known to be already in use in Afghanistan.

Michael V. CIA Director Leon Panetta confirmed that the president's order had been implemented in an April 9, memorandum to all CIA staff that stated unequivocally: "The CIA no longer operates detention facilities or black sites and has proposed a plan to decommission the remaining sites. Bush, Decision Points , p. According to Soufan, a CIA official told him in April that the aggressive techniques already had gotten approval from the "highest levels" in Washington. The official even waved a document in front of Soufan, saying the approvals "are coming from [White House counsel Alberto] Gonzales.

Bybee, assistant attorney general, to Alberto R. Gonzales, counsel to the president, regarding "Standards for Conduct of Interrogation under 18 U. Bradbury, principal deputy assistant attorney general, to John A. PDF accessed June 25, , p. He was interrogated in a way which a human cannot stand up…We were told that he - they rang the bell that he will die and somebody had to help him. Solitary confinement is discussed in this report in chapter 8, section II F , and chapter 5 in relation to al-Qahtani, particularly at p.

See also Army Brig. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Japan portal Schools portal. The Washington Post. Archived from the original on June 10, Also published online as "Diminished sense of safety in Japan". June 10, Retrieved on February 5, The Japan Times. Retrieved June 26, Kyodo News. March 28, The Lancet. PMID Retrieved Mass stabbing incidents before South Chicago Community Hospital 13—14 Jun Hidden categories: Webarchive template wayback links Articles with short description Short description is different from Wikidata Coordinates on Wikidata.

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